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– mehr als nur
Terrorismusbekämpfung

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Jörg Calließ

Alte Herausforderungen und Neue Herausforderungen

Auf der Suche nach Orientierungen für Weltordnungspolitik

Mit der Tagung, deren Protokoll hiermit vorgelegt wird, wurde eine Reihe von drei Veranstaltungen abgeschlossen, die sich alle mit den Gefährdungen durch den Terrorismus und mit dem Kampf gegen den Terrorismus beschäftigt haben.

Ganz unter dem Eindruck der schrecklichen Ereignisse und herausgefordert durch die Reaktionen darauf, begannen die Planungen im Spätherbst 2001. Damals ging es überhaupt erst mal darum, genau wahrzunehmen, was passiert war, wie es verstanden und gedeutet wurde und wie die Reaktionen darauf aussahen. Dementsprechend offen war noch die Beschreibung der Lage, mit der dem Planungs- und Vorbereitungsprozess eine Grundlage gegeben werden sollte:

„Der Terrorangriff vom 11. September 2001 wird die Außenpolitik der Weltmacht USA und die internationale Politik voraussichtlich noch auf Jahre bestimmen. Der Terrorismus wird seither als zentrale Herausforderung angesehen und die weltweite Bekämpfung des Terrorismus erhält deshalb absolute Priorität. Schon zeichnet sich ab, dass sich die USA in diesem Kampf ihre Führungsrolle durch nichts und niemanden streitig machen lassen und in der weltweiten Antiterror-Koalition vorgeben, was zu tun ist, wie vorgegangen werden soll und wer welche Rolle zu übernehmen hat. Dabei scheint eine neue Kombination, ja Parallelisierung von innen- und außenpolitischen Sicherheitsüberlegungen im Vordergrund zu stehen. Sie gewinnt ihre besondere Brisanz aus der Verbindung mit der Tendenz, die Staaten und Regierungen der Welt in zwei Gruppen aufzuteilen und die Unterstützer des Terrorismus zu bekämpfen, den Gegnern des Terrorismus aber Kooperation und Hilfe angedeihen zu lassen. So wird der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, der ja explizit glo-

Afrika wachsenden Unsicherheit, der nun angesichts der steigenden Gefährdung durch Terroranschläge noch verstärkt wird, ziehen sich Touristen und Unternehmen immer mehr aus der Region zurück. Dies verschärft in den meisten Ländern die bestehende wirtschaftliche Misere. Selbstverständlich reagieren Entwicklungspolitiker und Afrikaexperten auf die wachsende Terrorgefahr reflexartig mit der Mahnung, dass die Ursachen des Terrors bekämpft werden müssten. Doch selbst wenn die internationale Gebergemeinschaft ein Vielfaches ihrer Mittel für wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung, Armutbekämpfung und kulturellen Dialog aufwenden würde, dürfte es Jahrzehnte dauern, bis die Staaten Afrikas einen Entwicklungsstand erreicht haben, der die gewaltsame Lösung von Konflikten unwahrscheinlich macht. Und schließlich verhindert auch der Reichtum nicht die Bildung von Terrorzellen, wie das Beispiel Saudi-Arabien lehrt.

Das Problem wachsender Terrorbedrohung in Afrika bedarf auch kurzfristig wirkender Maßnahmen. Dazu könnte zum einen die Umkehrung des Trends zum militärischen Rückzug aus der Region gehören – die USA scheinen sich bereits zumindest in diese Richtung zu bewegen. Die Tatsache allerdings, dass weder die beträchtliche Präsenz französischer Truppen in Dschibuti noch die Aufklärungs- und Bekämpfungsbemühungen der deutschen Marine vor den Küsten Somalias und Ostafrikas einen Beitrag zur Verhinderung der Attentate in Mombasa leisten konnten, lässt an der Angemessenheit dieser Empfehlung zweifeln. Auch der Versuch, Terrorzellen in Somalia durch äthiopische Interventionstruppen bekämpfen zu lassen, war nur begrenzt erfolgreich. Vielmehr sollten die Bemühungen um kurzfristige Terrorbekämpfung in Afrika auf die Herstellung staatlicher Handlungsfähigkeit, insbesondere auf die Reform und Unterstützung der Polizei konzentriert werden.

Wo jedoch der Staat bereits in einem Grade zerfallen ist, dass nicht einmal enorme Investitionen in seine Sicherheitskräfte die Ausübung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols gewährleisten können, ist man mit schwierigen Fragen konfrontiert. Welche Alternativen gibt es zur direkten militärischen Intervention? Könnten private, paramilitärische Sicherheitsdienste – beauftragt und überwacht durch die internationale Staatengemeinschaft – lokal ein völkerrechtlich abgesichertes Gewaltmonopol ausüben?

Enrique Dussel Peters

World Order Policy: Conditions, Aims and Tasks

A Reflection

Introduction

Discussion on global governance has increased significantly since the 1990s. However, both the debate as well as its impact have apparently diminished since the events of September 11, 2001 in the US. From this perspective, what are the most significant topics and demands in periphery in terms of shaping the world order? Which expectations are realistic? What priorities should be established? What priorities should be established? Do we have a concept that does not overestimate the potential for shaping a new world order?

Having these questions in mind, this reflection will not discuss conceptually global governance and its potential in space and time.¹ The reflection will only analyze, in the first section, and briefly, on a general socioeconomic perspective on globalization and the current conditions of periphery. In the second section, the paper examines the challenges and policies that could be implemented in the short, medium and long run in the context of a new world order. The second part will propose and prioritize three general issues of a potential agenda of a “new world order”, and result from the prior section. The third section will refer to proposals of section two and integrate some comments on the discussion during the International Conference.

The paper discusses the latter issues from the perspective of Latin America, particularly knowing the socioeconomic conditions and historical development of Mexico and Central America, among others. Without a doubt, shaping a new world order “in space and time” results in different perspectives considering the respective territories in periphery. Finally, and considering the paper as a “reflection”, many of the issues will be examined briefly, also considering the objectives of the Conference.

1. Development and Current Socioeconomic Conditions in Latin America

Since the late 1970s most of periphery has been struck by an increasing socioeconomic and territorial polarization (Dussel Peters 2000). In brief, it has been examined that mainly – but not only – transnational corporations (TNCs) have been able to transfer an increasing part of their segments of their global commodity chain (Gereffi/Korzeniewicz 1994; Piore/Sabel 1984). The changes that were required by this new global socioeconomic structure – also known as flexible production – were implemented by an increased flexibilization in demand, and particularly in sectors such as automobiles, electronics and garments, among many others. Thus, specific context of an increasing openness in core and peripheral countries – including goods, services and capital, as well as through substantial improvements in transportation and electronic communication –, permitted the latter process of globalization. In contrast with prior historical periods, in which for example during ISI in Latin America TNCs either imported their goods from other countries to be sold or they were produced in the specific country for this specific market, since the 1980s a new production network has evolved: TNCs, but increasingly other firm, integrate to specific segments of global commodity chains depending on the strategy of the specific firm. Thus, countries no longer necessarily produce a final good, but participate in segments of its global commodity chain. These new global conditions, added to potential incentives in the respective country, catalyzes new investments, in order to respond to global demand and new forms of organization in space and time.

As a result, globalization – understood as a result of global commodity chains and flexible specialization –, has several effects. On the one hand, and considering the increasing “openness” of national States, globalization has territorial effects beyond the national frontiers, i.e. rather paradoxically for some, globalization has local effects. On the other hand, this historically new process – the “glocal” sphere (Altwater/Mahnkopf 1999) – creates profound socioeconomic and territorial challenges: territories – at the local, regional, supraregional, national and supranational level – integrate directly to the world market through this historical-specific form of globalization (Storper 1997). From a policy-making perspective, the “glocal”


sphere, rather than exclusively national perspective, is also the most appropriate one to face and counter globalization and tendencies that affect them, including education, socioeconomic development, poverty, etc. For many countries with a deeply rooted centralist tradition of policy-making such as Mexico, the delegation of resources, qualified personnel and decisions at the local level is an utmost difficult matter.

Additionally, this understanding of globalization in space and time has several other implications. On the one hand, it highlights the effects of globalization on territories. Contrary to most views of competitiveness in a context of globalization, it is territories which integrate directly to the world market. This is significant, since – and added to the distinction of competitiveness between firms and nations- there is a substantial difference between the competitiveness among territories and firms. Let us imagine, in the worst of the cases, highly competitive firms in a very underdeveloped and peripheral territory. On the other hand, the “glocal” implications and challenges of globalization in space and time are significant, since they can integrate in at least two extreme forms to the world market: either through a high degree of endogeneity, or, on the contrary, by generating of deepening a socioeconomic process of polarization (Dussel Peters 2000). Thus, the specific form of integration of a territory to the world market – in specific segments of the global commodity chain with impacts on inter and intrafirm relations, learning processes, value-added generation, employment, wages, and technological development and potential, among many other issues – is of critical relevance. As a result, systemic competitiveness and global commodity chains have to be understood from a territorial perspective in space and time, i.e. to generate territorial endogeneity.

This perspective is opposed to the current and more postmodern and “fashionable” view of “heterogeneity”, “fragmentation” or “diversification” of periphery. From a critical – and even cynical view-, it could be argued that periphery is “heterogeneous/fragmented/diverse”. The latter is not new “in space and time”, i.e. periphery has been heterogeneous/fragmented/diverse thousands of years ago, is still so, and will continue to be so in thousands of years. However, and as argued, the current process of globalization has generated a new process of socioeconomic and territorial polarization. The latter is fundamental for understanding current socioeconomic and territorial conditions and topics for a “new world order”.

Specifically, how has this socioeconomic and territorial polarization manifested in periphery, and as compared to the richest nations? Just to give a few examples²:


1. GDP per capita. For the period 1960-2000 GDP per capita – measured in 1995 US-Dollars and compared to the high income OECD countries- has declined substantially for practically all periphery. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, from 4.59 per cent in 1960 to 1.83 per cent in 2000; for Latin America and the Caribbean from 19.21 per cent in 1960 to 12.54 per cent in 2000. It is significant to mention that not only has the coefficient fallen, but also that the levels are very low, i.e. of the considered regions Latin America and the Caribbean has the highest level for the period. Other regions such as the Least Developed Countries according to the UN classification, have GDP levels below one per cent (see Chart 1).



2. Commercial energy use (kg. of oil per capital). For the period 1971-1999 the commercial energy use, as a percentage of high income OECD countries, has remained relatively stable, with two exceptions. On the one hand, it has fallen for Sub-Saharan Africa, from levels above 15 per cent in 1960 to levels below 13 per cent in the 1990s, and it increased for "middle income countries", according to the definition of the World Bank, for the period. The consumption of commercial energy use only fell in absolute terms for the period for the poor-

est countries, i.e. the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, Least Developed Countries (UN Classification) and Sub-Saharan Countries.

3. Similar tendencies are reflected for variables such as education, health expenditures, and the Human Development Index (UNDP) among others, i.e. the gap between the richer and the poorer countries has increased significantly since the 1960s.
4. Total debt service. Total debt service, as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) has also remained relatively high for periphery, and increased since 1970: it has doubled for the Least Developed countries to levels above three per cent in 2000 and almost tripled for Latin America in the Caribbean, accounting for more than 9.3 per cent in 2000. These tendencies are relevant, since they limit significantly the scope of action and resources of the public and private sectors.



5. Finally, polarization has not only increased between core and periphery countries, but also within periphery, i.e. as a result of different integration of households, firms, branches, sectors and regions, socioeconomic and territorial polarization has also increased within countries. For the case of Latin America, for example, households living under poverty levels accounted for 35 per cent during 1945-1980 and has since then increased to levels between 38 per cent and 41 per cent (Dussel Peters/Katz 2003; Stallings/Peres 2000).

Finally, but not in relevance, the global and socioeconomic conditions have changed substantially since the events of September 11, 2001 for global cooperation and global governance in general. As discussed in detail by Ezcurra (2002), the Bush Administration has implemented and imposed a much more militaristic and coercive agenda against terrorism as part of global cooperation: while since the 1980s the agenda was "not aid but trade", since September 11, 2001, practically any cooperation with the US-hegemony includes an agenda of "war against terrorism" as a "domestic security issue", including aid and trade, migration and overall cooperation. These unilateral measures by the US-administration make any kind of negotiation mucho more difficult.

2. Realistic Expectations of a New World Order:

Specific Demands and Priorities

From this perspective, what could be the main realistic goals and respective mechanisms for a new world order and global governance agenda? In brief – and based on multiple socioeconomic and territorial analysis in Latin America and particularly in Central America and Mexico-, it can be highlighted:

1. Discussions and options beyond "macroeconomic stability" and export-oriented industrialization (EOI). After the 1980s, in which multilateral agencies together with national elites imposed "structural adjustment programs", "macroeconomic stability" is still the main economic public objective of most governments. Independently of debates on neoliberalism and the "Washington Consensus", "macroeconomic stability" is highly limited and has significant macroeconomic and social limitations and flaws. On the one hand, "macroeconomic stability" – based on the control of inflation, state deficit and the attraction of foreign direct investments- does not control for other important macroeconomic variables such as employment, real wages, consumption, investment and income distribution, among others. On the other hand, this kind of macroeconomic policy – based on restrictive credit and monetary policies –, has high socioeconomic costs, including the overvaluation of the exchange rate, a minimal role of the financial sector for the respective domestic productive sectors, as well as continuing declining living conditions. The inability of this macroeconomic

policies and of export-oriented industrialization³ to "reach" the population and the microeconomy has been analyzed in detail for Latin America by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): a "reform of the reforms" (Stallings/Peres 2000) is proposed. Moreover, however, most countries in periphery require a debate and specific policy options to go beyond this "macroeconomic rationality" in policy making, i.e. how can periphery grow and generate employment with quality (wages) and equity (income distribution) even under low inflation? One of the main strengths of current "macroeconomic stability" has been the that few policy alternatives and options have been presented.

2. Strengthening of private and public institutions as well as of NGOs at the local, regional and level. Most of periphery has gone, since the 1980s, through dramatic "stabilization programs". These programs – enhanced by multilateral agencies and domestic elites in most of the cases – cut funding for institutions, since from a very short-run perspective they were considered simply a "cost". As a result, most of the countries do not have important institutions at the local, regional and national level that have a minimal level of representation. Such is the case for unions, business chambers, political parties, churches, and much more institutions that deal with specific local, regional and national topics. The creation and strengthening of institutions is of utmost relevance since they are the ones that permit the prioritization of objectives in "time and space" and that might negotiate with transnational corporations. Without these institutions, any prioritization could always be accused of "imposition" and/or not resulting from the specific territory.
3. Reduction of external debt. In the medium and long run it is not conceivable that periphery will decrease socioeconomic and territorial polarization, or even begin to tackle the problem, if both public and private sectors have to continue servicing huge amounts of GDP or national income for external debt. As an option to "simply" reducing the service or the absolute amount of external debt, in a "new world" order and/or as part of global governance, OCDE-countries together with local, regional and national institutions in periphery could use these specific amounts of resources on negotiated topics such as poverty, education and health, among others.

The latter issues, although general, could present the basis for a “new world order” in periphery, leaving sufficient scope for territories to determine its own priorities. Otherwise, let us imagine a “worst case scenario”, in which a “new world order” is again imposed on periphery.

3. Conclusions

While the concept of “global governance” goes beyond the proposals suggested in section 2, the main argument is that future visions of a “new world order” will have to consider, and prioritize, the process of socioeconomic polarization of periphery since the 1980s. The increasing needs, and desperation of its population, should be a priority for policies both, in periphery and in the core countries. These increasing gaps in terms of GDP per capita, poverty, energy consumption, but also within periphery, present the basis for increasing violence and potential terrorism, although it is not the aim of this paper to pose a necessary and strict correlation between poverty and “terrorism”, and particularly of “transnational terrorism”. These conditions, however, present a large potential for violence, as has also been the case in several Latin American countries.⁴

The latter issues, and also based on the discussion in the International Conference, leads to three final conclusions:

Although current discussion on terrorism seems to lead to a debate on the use or not of “force” and military interventions, the discussion should include more substantially to issues on what to do after such military interventions. While the decision of taking such measures might be relatively easy (sic), most of them have left aside the measures after these “chirurgical” interventions. The cases of Afghanistan, but also in other places of the world, are relevant from this perspective.

The latter issue also reveals that although the current discussion on “terrorism” seems to reflect a transatlantic and different perspective on the use of force between the United States and the European Union, there is also a different conception of development and its relationship with periphery. Thus, while the US vision shifted from “trade but not aid”, it currently focuses on trade, but strictly including issues on terrorism. In contrast, the European Union has, so far, not been willing to implement such development measures. Thus, behind the “terrorism” dis-

cussion the different development policy views arise. As discussed in the paper, the mixture of “trade + terrorism policies” pushed by the current Bush Administration is neither sufficient nor understands the needs of periphery and of global challenges.

Finally, the proposed policies within periphery are believed to lay the pillars for territorial self-determination in periphery. The imposition of priorities from core countries into periphery are believed not to be neither sustainable nor achievable in the short, medium and long run as part of a “new world order”.

Annotations

- 1 For a diverse discussion, see: Messner/Maggi (2002).
- 2 Most of the data provided is from the World Bank (2002); additional information can also be found at the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP).
- 3 It is significant to highlight that most of Latin America, and particularly Mexico, have already gone through an import structural change and shift in production towards exports. The latter, however, and until 2002, have not been able to achieve substantial economic growth and effects on the population.
- 4 See for example the case of Argentina, in which since the socioeconomic crisis of 2000-2001 kidnapping and overall violence has boomed.

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Klaus Segbers

Alternative Futures

1. INTRODUCTION¹

The pace of changes in world politics seems to be enormous, and it is. This impression may be stronger among people still remembering the seemingly cozy times of the Cold War than by those who were born and grew up more recently. There is hardly any doubt that most people on this planet, no matter where and how they live, and how well-trained they are in analyzing political processes –, find it difficult to understand the character of the processes going on around them. If we do not comprehend the context and texture of our present, however, it is risky to think about our future, or to make predictions.

Thus I start with the factors that I think are a given now, and will be for the foreseeable future. This includes the question of what is new and what is not so new after 1989/91 and after September 2001.

Then I proceed by defining the variables which will over the next ten years determine the two most relevant global political outcomes: the prospects for stability and cooperation.

And finally I draw up three scenarios for how we might get from now to then. These are: the Coming Anarchy; Gated Communities; and Global Learning. These three scenarios will be developed for nine cases: Capital, energy, and content flows; the roles of the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and China, respectively; regional conflicts; and structural problems.

While the views outlined in this article are German and European positions, they are certainly not the German or, even less so, the European way of reasoning.

2. MAKING SENSE OF CHANGES IN WORLD POLITICS

2.1 The Traditional Context

Many analytical and political problems result from concepts which are deeply embedded in Cold War thinking and, more general, in the logic of the Westphalian state system. Textbooks, the media, families, political decision makers and, to some extent, researchers still use terms and concepts for making sense of world politics that were, and are, a result of a bygone era. These 'old' concepts are not – or only partly – able to cover the reality of global politics in the early 21st century.

After the Thirty Years' War, a new concert of powers and new rules for the international game were established. Concepts like sovereignty and territoriality became the international norm. The notion of the modern nation state as the main agent for developing national economies and for protecting oneself against competitors and intruders, for providing public goods and creating homogeneous cultural spaces came to the fore. It was rather effective, and has been close to being worshipped ever since. Collecting taxes, organizing armed forces and educational systems became the main internal functions of governments. Establishing, defending and sometimes moving borders were the decisive external tasks. Going to war was not the first option but quite a legitimate one, once no other options for protecting the state's interests were available.

The macrostructure of politics changed twice in the 20th century: The first World War signified and brought about the decline of at least three empires: the Ottoman, the Russian, and the British empire. Post-revolutionary Russia was on her way toward a mobilizational as well as an etatistic "socialism in one country"; post-revolutionary Germany on her way toward a belated and derailed modernization, finally executed in the form of national socialism; and Japan had to cope with a difficult adaptation to the modernization process that started after the Meiji revolution and was always held back by traditional patterns. These three countries, their domestic instability and the resulting international disequilibria produced upheaval and destruction.

The global economy experienced a shift from the first generation motors of industrialization, the steam engine, iron, textiles and steel, to motor vehicles (auto manufacturing), electricity and the chemical industry. The great depression in the

late 1920s was a reminder that this development did not proceed smoothly. The interwar-period was culturally stimulating, but politically and economically inherently unstable.

The Second World War, resulting from these destabilizing factors, ended with the establishment of a new macrostructure. From now on, symbolized by the Yalta Conference, there were two powers, defending their respective blocs centered around two poles: The US-led part of the world, driven by largely market-regulated mechanisms, organized in formal democracies and generating increasing wealth for the "developed" parts of the world; and the USSR-led group of states, driven by an extensive growth model, organized in formal one-party systems and reproducing itself by administrative markets and all-encompassing bargaining mechanisms, providing basic social services on a rather low level.

Most of the other states had to opt for one of the two sides. Shifting between them was possible – sometimes. Keeping out of the conflict between the two sides during the Cold War was difficult, and China was the only – and growing – player who managed to do so. In those four decades automatization and electronics, computers and biotechnology engulfed all the most developed sectors of the world economy. In contrast to its predecessor, this period was intrinsically stable – contrary to widespread assumptions at the time. While there were serious international crises and even regional wars (1950/51 in Korea, 1967 in the Middle East, and in the 1960s and early 1970s Vietnam), a direct military confrontation between the two powers was never likely.

This period was characterized by a binary code, notwithstanding attempts to defect from this logic by some liberalizing elites and countries in the "Third World" and by political movements even at the core of the two blocs (Budapest 1956, Paris and Berlin in 1967, Prague and Berkeley 1968, Italy and France in the 1970s). Basically, it was "them versus us", between two world blocs, and this gruesome logic was forced upon all movements and persons who carefully or desperately tried to "break out", as dissenters in the Eastern bloc experienced with more force and brutality but no less dichotomic intensity than the new political and social movements in the West.

This was the period of the Cold War, while apparently fought over values and ideologies, in which on closer inspection economic interests, aspects of (in)security

and raw power mattered more. Strategic interaction between the two blocs and their lead actors was embedded in a web of institutions and bargaining mechanisms, offering guaranteed spaces for domination patterns, economic and otherwise, inside those blocs. What is important here for our argument and what should not be forgotten is that beyond all details and differences this bipolar macro system was stable, and it provided at least a basic feeling of security and belonging to something steady for most of the societies and elites.

The basic stability of the international macro structure was also related to the increasing role of international institutions – the Bretton Woods system, the United Nations and its Security Council, the CSCE and OSCE mechanisms, arms control and trade regimes and, more recently, norms for preserving the environment and for supporting human rights. The most relevant actors – the USSR and the US – never really rocked the boat, at least not beyond a certain extent. At the end of the day, there were two players who had to sort things out – which is what they did.

2.2 The New Context of World Politics

Westphalian and Cold War language still dominates most private and public discourses on global and world politics. But it is no longer linked to a context that can sufficiently be described in these terms – because the macro structure has undergone significant changes. The Westphalian system is no longer in place, even when its formal relics are still around. The binary Cold War system has crumbled – or has been overcome.

States and governments do not control most processes of global politics any more. The basic activities are represented and may be described as flows (of capital, communication, entertainment, goods and services, people) rather than as organized exchanges. The container state is still around, but the containers have lost many or most of their black box attributes. National governments can hardly control these flows, at least not on their own.

Moreover, the currency of politics has changed. Military power still matters – sometimes – as has been demonstrated most recently by the US-led campaign against Iraq in 2003 and by the Western-imposed measures against Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this is hardly the appropriate tool to achieve the main players' goals

in global times. The armed forces of the only remaining classical world power, the US, still can – alone or with allies – inflict considerable harm on one or two state adversaries and thereby deny them certain options: Saddam Hussein was forced out of Kuwait and in a second round out of power, similar to Milosevic who was forced out of Kosovo and subsequently out of power. But this is no guarantee for positive solutions, as both cases aptly demonstrate. In the Middle East the U.S. have not been and are not able to dictate anything approaching an acceptable, or impossible, solution. The currency of military power, when applied in a very complex world, cannot produce adequate outcomes.

In this new context, transnational capital flows are more relevant than national budgets, transnational cultural images and discourses are challenging national cultures, strategies of access and denial, of in- and exclusion are more decisive than guarding national borders. In such a new environment, a new cartography of power and access is urgently required in order to overcome the old standards of mapping. New tools for spreading influence and for dominating the nodes of webs and networks are emerging. The nodes and hubs of flows, cascades of power tools, new centralities of patchworks are at least as important as conquering the capitals of states. The old question of Stalin regarding the number of the pope's divisions looks outdated. What matters today is the influence in and over rating agencies, content producers and images.

We can compose a list of six attributes of global politics which are characteristic of the new inter- and transnational context after the Westphalian and the Cold War systems:

- *The game of global politics is a multilevel game.* Relevant actions, interactions, and flows take place and have effects on different levels at the same time: the global, the international, the transnational, the national, the regional, the societal and the individual. This complicates the problem of intentionality. The likelihood of unintended consequences of an action happening on one level is multiplied by the linkages between many levels. Also, the levels can hardly be isolated from one another.
- *Many more relevant actors are involved in global politics* than in international politics at any time before in the last 100, 50 or even 15 years. These actors are related to the spheres of the state; the market; and the social and societal con-

text. Important cleavages are public vs. private, and state vs. non-state. Who are the relevant actors? States still play an important role as regulators, and especially as the target for public expectations. But this role is diminishing and changing. State actors have to locate themselves in a colorful picture containing many other actors. Additionally, there are IOs, international regimes, TNCs, NGOs, regional players (supra- and sub-state), the media, domestic structures and interests, and individuals – from Mr. Bush and Mr. Gates to Mr. Haider and Mr. Atta. Or Mother Theresa.

- *The relative strength of different groups of players is shifting* – depending on the game and on the available hard and soft resources. The decisive power currencies of all kinds of actors are much more diverse than the military as the core element of hard power. Asymmetries between the diverse actors can be extreme – the relations between Al Qaeda und the U.S. or between Falun Gong and the Chinese authorities are just two examples.
- *There are no clearly delineated boundaries between the domestic and the external spheres of politics anymore.* The global environment can have a decisive impact on domestic constellations. Domestic structures and coalitions produce significant changes in the transnational landscape. Even rather sophisticated concepts like second image reversed, two-level games and the internationalization of domestic politics look a bit outdated today. To put it bluntly: The problem is not so much one of linkages between the domestic and the international spheres, but rather the vanishing of the markers between those realms.
- *The nature of interactions is increasingly difficult to monitor, to control and to govern.* Diplomats may talk about many things, but their impact on capital markets is limited – to say the least. The impact of satellites transmitting content into different cultural settings can hardly be predicted and is difficult to regulate. Many capital and content flows are difficult to organize and cannot be regulated effectively – at least not by the traditional instruments and strategies inherited from the Westphalian and Cold War settings.
- *The very concept of regulating and controlling processes and developments is in crisis.* Regulation requires a clear conception of the relevant players' interests and resources, viable mechanisms for monitoring, sufficient funding, tools for impacting on the actors involved, providing incentives for relevant actors to ac-

cept governance mechanisms, and, first and foremost, it requires concepts as to what should be regulated and in what way. There is much talk about global governance but very limited clarity about how this should be done.

In reality, we have a patchwork of parallel, co-existing and competing norms, tools and systems of governance. The very term “governance” is in crisis. What is needed is fresh thinking about new concepts which are more appropriate for the early 21st century – concepts of moderating and of navigating. To moderate processes does not mean to change their direction but to influence the intensity and the pace of their development. To navigate trends and currents is even less of an ‘engineering’ concept: here one just tries to move in and between the currents of processes the sources and driving forces of which are beyond anyone’s control.

This list gives a brief impression of what is new in global politics, compared to both the Westphalian and the Cold War systems. The new qualities of these attributes have not been designed and did not come to bear in 1989 or 1991, or in 2001. But those years and the events related to them symbolize the changing currents at a deeper level.

My basic prediction is that these new attributes will be present for quite some time – definitely beyond 2010. We should not expect any actor or institution to restore some sort of higher order in the game of global politics. The world is not unilateral or neo-imperial – whatever degree of military power the US may reach. It is, obviously, not a UN-regulated world either. We have to live in, and cope with, this kind of an insecure environment, at least for the coming decades.

2.3 The world in the first decade of this century

One cannot address, explain or forecast everything in global politics. Some selection for the readers' and the author's purposes have to be made. In this context, two qualities will be defined as outcomes (dependent variables) which will be explained or predicted. These variables will serve as our main criteria for different scenarios. For the sake of our experiment, we will keep the number of dependent variables small and limit them to just two: *in-stability* of rule acceptance, and *non-cooperation* between actors.

This selection may seem traditional and outdated to some readers. I don't think it is: Most people are interested in environments providing exactly these qualities. Without stability, institutions will not work adequately. Without a visible shadow of the future, stability and working institutions cannot be guaranteed. Stability is a requirement for predictability. Those concepts – stability and cooperation – are also well taken as benchmarks for defining relevant outcomes in global politics.

Stability (or the absence of it) is defined as a decisive quality of the global and European landscapes. Stability does not require romantic visions of conflict free zones. It implies the existence of stable and workable institutions (rules) that may be changed in organized ways, at least in core regions.

This presupposes shared basic interests, a strong shadow of the future and relatively long time horizons, the experience and expectation of repeated games, producing effective institutions for sustainable development, effective mechanisms for conflict regulation or resolution, incentives and tools for exchanging goods, services and images, conditions for access to relevant flows and for not too diverse images and identities.

Cooperation (or the absence of it) is the other decisive quality of global and European landscapes. It does not imply complete consent of interests, same-class players or the absence of conflicts. Rather, similar interest patterns are required for rules, time horizons and, consequently, for stability. Additionally, conducive to cooperation are the capacity to address different, and different classes of, actors; linkages between different levels of action (and of analysis); and an interest in the predominance of absolute, not relative gains.

Now we turn to our independent variables (IV) causing variation in the outcomes: structural changes and modifications of the macro configuration characterized by these six new attributes of world politics. They should not be expected to change greatly over the next ten years. The global, then, is conditioned and characterized by these six factors: multilevel games; multitude of actors; shifting strength of actors and type of resources; no markers between the domestic and the global; new quality of interaction – flows; crisis of control concepts.

These factors can be defined as independent variables for determining the future course of world politics. With these factors, we can define a *maximum of six independent variables* possibly causing variation of our two dependent variables,

and thereby constituting different scenarios. These scenarios will be defined in the next part of this article. For systematic and for practical reasons, we limit the number of operating IVs to three.

IV 1: Number of relevant levels of political games.

Hypothesis 1: Fewer significant levels generate more stability and more cooperation. It seems difficult to extend institutions effective on one level to other levels. Theoretical basis: Neoinstitutionalism.

IV 2: Number of relevant actors involved.

Hypothesis 2: Fewer relevant actors produce more stability and cooperation. The greater the number of relevant players, the more difficult to impose authority and to avoid moral hazard and defection problems. Theoretical basis: Collective action.

IV 3: Relative strength of actors and type of resources.

Hypothesis 3: Combinations of hard and soft resources are conducive to furthering stability and cooperation. Separation of hard and soft resources between different types of actors adversely affect stability and cooperation. Clear signals and credible announcements are important. Theoretical basis: Rational choice and system theory.

IV 4: Relationship between domestic and global factors.

No hypothesis formulated. The boundaries between domestic and international matters are blurred. No significant variance can be expected.

IV 5: Type of interaction – controlled exchange or flows.

No hypothesis formulated. The number and intensity of flows is likely to be neutral regarding stability and cooperation, or the concept of flows is not compatible with these concepts.

IV 6: Control concepts.

No hypothesis suggested. The concepts of regulation and control are hardly compatible with the other features. Required are ideas of navigating in world politics.

We thus avoid an overly complex setting and produce *three independent variables and three hypotheses* for *two varying outcomes* to be explained.² Each of these scenarios will be developed for nine cases. Those cases are both related to flows and to places and spaces.

Three cases are related to flows, i.e. to rather new, late 20th century forms of interaction.

- *Capital flows* may be found at different levels: regional, national, inter- and transnational, and global. They are formalized or informal. Mostly, they are channeled via commercial and state banks. Yet there are informal mechanisms of transactions of capital as well. The latter seem to gain in importance. Capital flows are the blood circulation of global capitalism.
- *Content flows* are another example of a rather new global phenomenon. Content flows consist of mainly three components: information, communication, and entertainment. Information in digital form is accessible through the world wide web. It has, by now, become the most important source for storing, processing and retrieving knowledge. Almost everything can be found on the internet. Moreover, communication in the form of electronic mail has become the primary form of exchange in the global world. Cell phones are widespread, not only in capitals and cities. Content flows are the brain circuits of post-modernism;
- *Energy* is, besides knowledge, the most important resource of the 21st century. Dependency on energy imports or, conversely, the availability of resources for self-demand or export are decisive factors in Europe's development. Indeed, energy is the fuel of industrial and post-industrial economies.

Four cases represent countries or regional blocs:

- *The United States (US)* is sometimes called the only remaining superpower after the end of the Cold War. Others speak of a unilateral world order with one pole – the US. These views are not adequate, at least not sufficient. They are caught up in Westphalian state-level and great power thinking. They overlook how many important debates are taking place in the US, how diverse and heterogeneous this country is, and how limited even US power is when it comes to enforcing political outcomes and implementing political solutions.

- *The Russian Federation (RF)* is important, at least for Europe. This is a difficult region, slowly moving toward more internal stability and cooperation. The future development of the RF is of great importance to the prospects of the rest of Europe.
- *The European Union (EU)* is the framework for most of Europe located West of the RF. These European countries are either member states, or candidates for this status – including Turkey.
- *China* is the emerging dominant actor in Asia. The importance of China is related to both the number of its inhabitants and, increasingly, its economic dynamism.

Additionally, two non-regional cases will be included.

- *Regional conflicts* have been the single most important source of violent unrest for many decades. They can be framed in ethnic, religious, cultural or other terms.
- *Structural problems*, especially that of widening legitimacy gaps (differentials between representation and effectiveness) in national and global politics. The agencies entitled to do politics are not able to deliver, while those who effectively shape politics are not always democratically legitimized to do so.

3. SCENARIOS AND CASES

I offer three basic scenarios for the European and Eurasian political development up to 2010. This is not the place and the framework for testing all the proposed hypotheses in detail, but I will examine the nine cases in three scenarios regarding two possible outcomes. The differing outcomes are influenced by three independent variables – levels of activity, the number of actors and the type of resources.